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Abstract. Social Networks (SN) users have various privacy require-
ments to protect their information; to address this issue, a six-stage
thematic analysis of scholarly articles related to SN user privacy con-
cerns were synthesized. Then this research combines mixed methods re-
search employing the strengths of quantitative and qualitative research
to investigate general SN users, and thus construct a new set of five pri-
mary and Twenty-five secondary SN user privacy requirements. Such an
approach has been rarely used to examine the privacy requirements. Fac-
tor analysis results show superior agreement with theoretical predictions
and significant improvement over previous alternative models of SN user
privacy requirements. This research presented here has the potential to
provide for the development of more sophisticated privacy controls which
will increase the ability of SN users to: specify their rights in SNs and to
determine the protection of their own SN data.
Keywords: Users Privacy, Social Networks, Social Networks Function-
ality, Information Disclosure, Thematic Analysis, Privacy Framework,
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1 Introduction
Privacy can be conceptualised from a variety of discipline perspectives such as
Social Sciences, Law, Architecture, Urban Design, Health Sciences and Computer
and Information Science. However, the three main dimensions through which to
describe and analyse privacy [26] are the legal, social and technical dimensions.
The legal dimension focuses on laws, contracts and policies to protect individual
privacy, whereas the social dimension concentrates on managing privacy accord-
ing to individual and collective everyday social relationships and the boundaries
between private and public life. The technical dimension focuses on technical
specifications that protect privacy by controlling (automatically and/or manu-
ally) data and information. As a result of legal breaches, civil and/or criminal
? NICTA is funded by the Australian Goverment through the Department of Commu-
nication and the Austalian Research Council through the ICT Center of Excellenece
Program.
penalties can occur, whereas social breaches can cause potential embarrassment
or social breakdown in a relationship. Technical breaches can be a source of
identity theft, unauthorized access, and illegal use of information [26].
Hodge [16] aptly points out that Social Networks (SNs) are designed as public
spaces for the private individual; however, since individuals use these public
spaces to disseminate their personal information, the networks become the source
of complex privacy issues. This paper focuses on these SN privacy issues as
documented by analysts, researchers, and users. In so doing, it determines the
issues that need to be addressed in this area. Privacy has become a significant
contemporary issue [17] in SNs due to the massive sharing and exchange of
personal information such as pictures and online activities. Inappropriate usage,
such as connecting contacts without confirming identity, may lead to serious
scenarios4 and privacy breaches5. Analysts and researchers confirm that SN users
have become more aware of privacy breaches and that this could affect their
future SN engagement6.
There is no rigid definition of privacy [18]; indeed, in various research areas
(for example, research into databases, data mining, networks, security, and Social
Science), the term ‘privacy’, with reference to SNs, has quite different meanings
(Figure 1 represents multiple representations of privacy in SN contexts). Gener-
ally speaking, however, ‘privacy’ can be defined as ‘personal control over personal
content’, and a person’s failure to control this content can constitute a privacy
breach [17, ?].
A variety of methods may be suitable in exploring SN user privacy require-
ments; each has its advantages and drawbacks. Findings from Yin [40] suggest
that case study method is the most widely used to investigate contemporary phe-
nomena within certain real-life contexts where the investigator has little control
over the events. A case study typically uncovers what is actually there, and
the existing or missing features which users may be aware of. SN user privacy
requirements may be uncovered in a case study; however, many privacy require-
ments are not addressed at all by typical social networking sites and cannot be
uncovered from a study of existing systems.
Similarly, users are largely oblivious to the risks and have even less idea about
what SN functionality may be able to assist them; therefore, a case study of ‘in-
nocent’ users is not sufficient. While there is a need to investigate user knowledge
and explicit user concerns, there is also a need to explore user requirements. For
example, essential SN functionalities which allow a user to simply explore and
comprehend their exposure are needed. There should also be functionalities that
allow SN users to explore vulnerabilities that may require a deeper understand-
4 Facebook′Friends′Murder25 − Y ear − OldGirl : http :
//news.peacefmonline.com/news/201208/130827.php
5 Coeburnpoliceofficeraccusedofsolicitingsexfrom15 − year − oldgirl : http :
//www.timesnews.net/article/9050978/coeburn−police−officer−accused−of−
soliciting − sex− from− 15− year − old− girl
6 Sickof Facebook′s lackofrespectforyourdata?Tellothersthatyou′re quitting too! :
http : //www.quitfacebookday.com/
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Fig. 1. What is privacy?
ing of the system. In short, users should be able to easily see what actions they
can take to protect their privacy.
This research focused on technical dimension to examine SN user privacy
breaches and requirements aligns with the privacy focus of this study. This paper
is organised into five sections:
– clarification of the research model for the investigation (Section 2)
– review and synthesize of SN user privacy requirements, using thematic anal-
ysis (Section 3)
– validation of SN user privacy requirements (Section 4)
– the research results (Section 5)
– summary and conclusion of the paper (Section 6)
2 Research model for exploring SN user privacy
requirements
This research used thematic analysis to review and synthesize SN user privacy
requirements in a systematic way. Thematic analysis is a flexible approach to
analysing data in primary qualitative research. It searches for, identifies, and
reports themes or patterns [5], and clarifies the meaning of data by moving back
and forth between all data to identify themes or patterns. Thematic analysis is
independent of theory and epistemology, and can be applied across a range of
investigation. It is useful in privacy research because of this theoretical freedom.
This research was developed by conducting a thematic analysis of scholarly
articles related to user privacy in SNs, and grouping the findings into primary
3
Fig. 2. Research model for exploring SN user privacy requirements
and secondary user privacy requirements. These privacy requirements were then
validated through several steps, including pre-pilot assessment, and pilot and
final surveys. Finally, the validated SN user privacy requirements were used to
develop the SN privacy architecture and privacy framework.
3 Review and synthesize SN user privacy requirements
This research organized privacy issues, which have been inductively and de-
ductively derived from the literature review, as themes. This thematic method,
then, is the analytical framework which addresses SN user privacy issues. These
issues are eventually engaged as a bridge between SN functionalities and SN user
privacy requirements.
This research adapted the thematic analysis method to include its 6 stages,
as described by Braun and Clarke [5] and detailed below. These stages are used
to gather all relevant articles, based on keywords and search queries. A similar
research pattern was also applied by Grses [14] to determine community privacy
issues in online news and blogospheres.
Stage 1: Familiarization with the data, and gathering the data
This stage set up a query of scholarly article search engines and bibliographic
databases, such as Google Scholar7 and Scirus8, with related search terms.
Both databases have ‘export citation’ features to various bibliography managers.
7 http : //scholar.google.com
8 http : //www.scirus.com/
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Scholarly articles were included in, or excluded from this query according to spe-
cific criteria. They needed to:
(a) Be written in English
(b) Discuss technical topics
(c) Explicitly refer to SN users’ general privacy concerns
(d) Discuss SN privacy issues, breaches, concerns, and privacy violations in gen-
eral
(e) Focus on SN user privacy requirements in general
Excluded articles are those that discuss:
(a) Legal topics
(b) Social topics
(c) Solutions for innovative SN architecture
(d) Solutions for innovative SN frameworks solutions
The queries ran in English, and the search results were restricted to articles
written in English. Articles which discuss legal or social topics were eliminated,
while articles discussing technical topics were included as this research focuses
on technical dimensions. The articles discussing solutions for innovative SN ar-
chitecture and SN frameworks were eliminated since this research is concerned
with the discussion of general issues relating to SN user privacy, rather than with
innovative solutions. The research focuses on the privacy issues related to the in-
novative architectures and frameworks. Articles which explicitly discuss general
SN privacy breaches, privacy violations and privacy requirements, were included
for further analysis. These articles were included according to their technical
dimensions, which assisted the exploration of SN user privacy requirements.
‘And’ operator was used to search the articles with a combination of ‘social
network’, ‘users’, ‘privacy’, ‘concerns’, ‘requirements’, ‘paradox’ and ‘breaches’,
so as to limit the number of search results. Search queries and the number of
return and downloaded items (after deleting duplicates) are illustrated in Table
1 below.
Table 1. Search queries and number of return and downloaded items after deleting
duplicates
# Search queries Number of
return items
Number of down-
loaded items
1 ‘social network’ and ‘user privacy concerns’ 210 190
2 ‘social network’ and ‘user privacy requirements’ 29 28
3 ‘social network’ and users and ‘privacy paradox’ 353 338
4 ‘social network’ and users and ‘privacy breaches’ 441 431
Total 987
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Zotero9, a free and open source reference management tool, was used to
gather, organize, and analyse sources. Zotero is a useful research tool for man-
aging bibliographic data and related research materials (Refer to Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Stored articles in the Zotero research tool
All relevant articles collected were gathered into a data corpus as raw data.
The data corpus was then checked for duplicates, and invalid or irrelevant con-
tent and, eventually, the relevant data was located. The latter then became the
‘data set’. From the data set, initial codes were identified for further analysis.
This coding allowed this research to organize the data into meaningful groups
and themes (Figure 4 provides a detailed flow diagram). For each article, meta-
tags were added; these included publication details, such as publication type,
author/s, where published, volume, issue, pages, date, URL, when accessed, li-
brary catalogue and date. Each article was coded using the thematic organizing
tags.
Stage 2: Theoretical foundations and generation of initial codes
In the previous stage – the reviewing and synthesizing of SN user privacy
requirements – a series of studies which included the theoretical background
to their authors’ investigation of individuals’ privacy concerns were identified.
These studies assisted with the generation of initial codes.
9 http : //www.zotero.org/
6
Fig. 4. Review flow
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Smith et al. [32], for example, used a reflective framework to measure or-
ganizational privacy concerns in four dimensions: the collection of an extensive
amount of personal data; unauthorized secondary uses of personal information;
improper access to personal data; and errors or inaccuracy in personal informa-
tion. Smith et al. [32] also found that users might not like unsolicited communi-
cations and automatic data transfer. Brown and Muchira [6] consider Smith et
al.’s [32] five contextual issues (as listed above) to examine consumers’ privacy
concerns. Malhotra et al. [23] conceptualize inter-user information privacy issues
as: collections of personal information; users’ control over collected information;
and awareness of users’ privacy practice. Spiekermann and Cranor [33] empha-
sise exposure, unwanted inflow of data, and unauthorized execution, as well as
the individual issues described by Smith et al. [32].
There are also various dimensional or factorial models available for repre-
senting privacy issues. For example, ‘Model 1’ – a one-dimensional (one factor)
model – is a plausible model underlying data structure [11]; this model can as-
sess the level of concern about an issue using an option survey such as, ‘How
concerned are you about threats to your privacy in America today? ’ [34]. ‘Model
2’ is a two-dimensional (two-factor) model where privacy issues can be measured
as both ‘information collection’ and ‘maintance of that information’ [32]. ‘Model
3’ is three-dimensional (three-factor), where privacy issues can be reflected into
‘information collection’, ‘information management’ (which includes errors and
unauthorised access), and ‘secondary use’ [32].
The thematic analysis method included a step to generate initial codes. The
theoretical foundations and various models (detailed above) assisted us to: i) gen-
erate initial codes in the reviewing and synthesizing of SN user privacy require-
ments (describes in this section); and ii) to validate SN user privacy requirements
(as described in Section 4.3 below). This step was used for systematic coding
across the entire data set to trace its interesting features [5].
Stage 3: Searching for themes
This stage consisted of collating codes into potential themes by inductively
and deductively gathering all the data relevant to each theme [5]. Each theme
can be a combination of various codes. Themes are also assigned to other themes,
which become sub-themes. Tags for each theme were individually added to each
scholarly article. In the next step, these tags were clustered and grouped under
each theme. Each of the themes contained multiple tagged items.
Stage 4: Reviewing themes
This stage consisted of checking the themes data corpus and entire data set,
to generate a thematic map of the analysis [5]. The themes which were reviewed
and generated through mapping were systematically tagged in previous stage.
Some themes were grouped as sub-themes under suitable themes. Themes were
reviewed deductively and inductively to generate modified themes.
Stage 5: Defining and naming themes
This stage included analysis to refine each theme, and assisted in generating
clear definitions and names for each theme. Each theme focused on specific types
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of privacy issues. Eventually, these themes were considered as the key themes
related to privacy issues, as illustrated in Table 7 below.
Stage 6: Analysis
This stage included a scholarly discussion of the analysis. Each theme was la-
belled a ‘privacy requirement’ of SN users, and there are 10 of these themes/requirements
(See Table 2 below). These requirements are validated in Section 4.
Table 2: Privacy requirements with privacy issues
No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
1 Accountability
and Trans-
parency
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to account-
ability,
visibility
or trans-
parency in
SN user in-
formation
[39]
Users are
added to var-
ious groups
or networks
without user
concern.
Users may want
to exercise more
control over
their addition to
various groups
or networks [29].
Users may
be ignored or
become lost
in the maze
of complicated
privacy poli-
cies that the
SN actually
states.
Users may want
simplified and
user-friendly
privacy policies.
[36]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
SN provider
states that
it is users’
responsibility
when they add
an application,
while the TPA
privacy policy
is governed
by the SN
policies.
SN users may
expect a SN
provider’s
constructive
assistance when
they add a
Third Party
Application.
[36]
Users might
know noth-
ing about
how they
are targeted
by advertis-
ers, and do
not have a
transparent
view of their
information
uses.
Users may
want to know
how they are
targeted by
advertisers and
may want a
transparent
view of their
information uses
[29].
2 Collection
and storage
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due to
unlimited,
inappro-
priate and
extensive
amounts of
personal in-
formation
collection
and storage
in SN
([6, 23, 32]
Users might
not under-
stand the
privacy and
data use pol-
icy, such as
how their
personal in-
formation
during and
subsequent to
registration
will be used.
Users may want
to understand
the privacy and
data use policy,
such as how
their personal
information
during and
subsequent to
registration will
be used [2].
[36] )
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
User informa-
tion, activities,
identity and
interests may
be collected
and stored
indefinitely.
Users might
not want their
information, ac-
tivities, identity
and interests
to be collected
and stored
indefinitely.
[2, ?]
The SN service
provider can
collect, anal-
yse or delete
any or all the
profiles and
activities of its
users.
SN users might
assume that the
provider is not
able to collect,
analyse or delete
any or all the
profiles and
activities of its
users.
[33, 36,
39]
3 Combining
Data
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to a com-
bination of
personal
data with
other in-
formation;
this pro-
vides more
compre-
hensive
user profile
informa-
tion[32]
SN infor-
mation can
be used to
identify the
physical lo-
cation of a
person.
SN users may
expect that their
information will
not be used to
identify physical
location.
[32]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Advertising
can create
problems by
using SN
user loca-
tions without
notification.
Advertising
should not cre-
ate problems by
using SN user lo-
cations without
notification.
[38]
Mobile SN
users may
not want to
participate
in dynamic
interaction
facilitated by
their presence
and location.
Mobile SN users
may not want
to participate
in dynamic
interaction facil-
itated by their
presence and
location.
[20]
4 Deletion Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to inappro-
priate data
deletion in
SN
[39]
Users might
not be able to
permanently
delete their
accounts.
Users may want
to be able to per-
manently delete
their accounts.
([33,
39])
Users might
not be able
to perma-
nently delete
their digital
contributions.
Users may want
to be able to per-
manently delete
their digital con-
tributions [29].
Users might
experience
issues with
the retention
of deleted
information.
Users may want
to know the
SN retention
policies regard-
ing deleted
information [29].
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Users might
experience SN
retention of
their deleted
information
for a couple
of years or
indefinitely.
Users may not
want the SN
provider to
retain their
deleted infor-
mation for a
couple of years
or indefinitely
[29] .
Users are un-
able to delete
data such
as friend re-
quests, posts,
status update,
messages, and
pokes on a per
item basis.
Users may want
to delete data
such as friend
requests, posts,
status update,
messages, and
pokes on a per
item basis [2].
Users might
experience a
complicated
data deletion
process.
Users may want
a simplified,
user-friendly
data deletion
process.
[20]
5 Error Privacy
issues cre-
ated due to
accidental
or deliber-
ate error in
SN infor-
mation [23,
32]
SNs might
retain ad-
click data
indefinitely;
this might be
unacceptable.
SN users may
not want their
SN ad-click data
kept indefinitely.
[2]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Users’ full
name and
contact de-
tails might
be mandatory
provided infor-
mation in SNs;
this makes
users easily
traceable.
Users may want
functionalities
which allow
them to op-
tionally provide
their full name
and contact
details in SNs.
[37]
Users may be
unaware that
their profile
may be pub-
licly available
by default as
a result of
privacy policy
changes.
Users may not
want their pro-
file publicly
available by
default.
[37]
SN users may
allow their in-
formation eas-
ily viewable by
a third party;
this can create
privacy issues.
SNs may want
their informa-
tion is not easily
viewable by
a third party
since this can
create privacy
instances.
[37]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
6 Improper
or unau-
thorized
access
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due to
unautho-
rized and
inappropri-
ate access
to view or
work with
the data
([23, 32])
Users may
be unable
to avoid
unwanted
accessibility
to informa-
tion (or to
ascertain if in-
formation has
been accessed)
because con-
tacts may
have copied
and reposted
information,
thus bypass-
ing privacy
settings.
Users may
want to avoid
unwanted ac-
cessibility to
information (or
to ascertain
if information
has been ac-
cessed) because
contacts may
have copied and
reposted their
information,
thus bypassing
privacy settings.
[15, 29]
Users receive
unwanted
communi-
cation from
restricted or
unwanted con-
tacts inside
or outside the
networks.
Users may not
want to receive
unwanted com-
munication from
restricted or un-
wanted contacts
inside or outside
the networks.
[4, 15,
37]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
User location
information
can be dis-
closed and
used for
tracking; rami-
fications could
range from
annoying, to
embarrassing,
to downright
dangerous.
Users may not
want their lo-
cation informa-
tion to be dis-
closed and used
for tracking.
[7, 38]
Third par-
ties can gain
access to
user informa-
tion through
deceitful con-
ductor or other
users, without
infringing ‘by
default’ pri-
vacy settings
which were
pre-set by the
SN providers
but not cus-
tomized by the
users.
Users may not
want third
parties to gain
unauthorized
access to their
information
through de-
ceitful conduct
or other users
without infring-
ing ‘by default’
privacy settings.
[37]
Internal or ex-
ternal parties
can stalk SN
users.
Users may not
want to be
stalked by inter-
nal or external
parties.
[13, 37]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Third party
application
providers may
not specify
the extent of
user informa-
tion gathered
through the
application,
which may
harvest infor-
mation from
their network
without their
knowledge.
Users may want
third party
application
providers to
specify the
extent of the
gathering and
harvesting of
their informa-
tion from their
network through
the application.
[7,
?,37])
Identity issues
such as false
names, im-
personation,
or identity
theft can be
caused by
profiling and
data mining.
Users may not
want identity
issues such as
false names,
impersonation,
or identity theft
to result from
profiling and
data mining.
[7]
Users may
experience
unlimited use
of informa-
tion by other
parties such
as marketers,
and HR and
government
agencies.
Users may not
want the un-
limited use of
information by
other parties
such as mar-
keters, HR or
government
agencies.
[37]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
7 Poor or
reduced
judgement
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to poor or
reduced
judgement
based on
incorrect
or partial
personal
data in SNs
[32]
Other users
can influence
content on or
related to a
profile, such
as relational
information.
Users may want
other users to in-
fluence the con-
tent on or re-
lated to their
profile, such as
relational infor-
mation.
[37]
8 Unauthorized
secondary
use (in-
ternal &
external)
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to unau-
thorized
and inap-
propriate
secondary
use of the
SN data by
the Service
Provider
and third
parties
or other
external
parties
([6, 23, 32,
33])
Uploaded
digital contri-
butions might
be disclosed
and/or un-
expectedly
abused by
a group of
contacts and
criminals.
Users may not
want their up-
loaded digital
contributions
to be disclosed
and/or unex-
pectedly abused
by a group of
contacts and
criminals.
[1]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Users expe-
rience the
SN provider
sharing in-
formation
with external
parties such
as criminals,
commercial
websites, mar-
keters, HR or
government
agencies.
Users may not
want the SN
provider to
share infor-
mation with
external parties
such as crimi-
nals, commercial
websites, mar-
keting, and HR
or government
agencies.
[1]
The service
provider may
grant license
for further
use of user
information
and content by
their Terms of
Use.
Users may not
want the service
provider to
grant license for
further use of
user information
and content by
their Terms of
Use.
([7, 30])
Users may
experience
their pub-
licly available
information
being collected
and misused
by external
parties such as
marketers, HR
or government
agencies.
Users may not
want their pub-
licly available
information to
be collected
and misused
by external
parties such as
marketers, HR
or government
agencies.
([2, 27])
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
User infor-
mation can
be exposed
through a
chain of FOAF
(Friend of a
friend).
Users may not
want their in-
formation to be
exposed through
a chain of FOAF
(Friend of a
friend).
[4]
9 Undesirable
or excessive
exposure
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due to
undesirable
or excessive
exposure
by other
SN users
[33]
User informa-
tion can be
shown unex-
pectedly to
someone (for
example, a
stranger, par-
ents, relatives,
a teacher, a
boss, an ‘ex’);
this can cause
inconvenience
for the users.
Users may not
want their in-
formation to be
shown unexpect-
edly to someone
(for example, a
stranger, par-
ents, relatives, a
teacher, boss, an
‘ex’); this may
cause inconve-
nience for the
users.
([1, 29])
Unwanted
or unfore-
seeable user
information
and uploaded
content can
be publicly
disclosed.
Users may
not want their
unwanted or
unforeseeable
information
and uploaded
content to be
publicly dis-
closed.
[14]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
Users might
experience
other users
tagging them
in offensive
photos, posts
and real life ac-
tivities, which
may present
them in an
unflattering
manner.
Users may not
want other users
to be able to tag
them in offensive
photos, post and
real life activi-
ties, which may
present them in
an unflattering
manner.
[1]
The location
granularity as-
sociated with
photos can
create privacy
and location
disclosure
issues.
Users may not
want their loca-
tion granularity
to be associated
with photos,
which can create
privacy and lo-
cation disclosure
issues.
[1]
Users’ private
informa-
tion, such
as location
information,
can be re-
vealed through
the real time
publishing
of uploaded
pictures.
Users may not
want private
information,
such as location
information,
to be revealed
through the real
time publishing
of uploaded
pictures.
[1]
Continued on next page
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No.Privacy
dimen-
sions
DescriptionPrivacy
issues
Privacy re-
quirements
Major
liter-
ature
refer-
ences
10 Unwanted
execution
or inflow of
data
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to unau-
thorized
execution
in personal
devices or
operation
by spyware,
which trig-
ger unau-
thorized
collection
of personal
data
[33]
Trusted con-
tacts can
be involved in
unsolicited pri-
vacy breaches
and issues.
Users may
expect that
trusted contacts
will not be
involved in un-
solicited privacy
breaches and
issues.
[1]
Privacy issues
may arise
through inter-
action between
mobile and
traditional
SNs.
Users may not
want privacy
concerns to
arise through
interaction be-
tween mobile
and traditional
SNs.
[1]
User infor-
mation can
be leaked
through di-
rect attacking
techniques.
Users may not
want their in-
formation to be
leaked through
direct attacking
techniques.
[15]
4 Validating SN user privacy requirements
Understanding user privacy concerns/issues is important to the investigation of
SN user privacy requirements. The methodology used in this study is premised
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on the ideas of past studies which have captured SN user privacy require-
ments. Through the thematic analysis of key words in previous studies of privacy
issues in online social networks, user privacy issues in SNs have been captured;
these issues have then been used to inductively develop primary ‘Privacy re-
quirements’ and a user privacy framework, using a bottom-up approach. This
approach assumes that the previous work accurately captures the sets of needs
users may have. However, analysing existing research might not be the best way
to obtain all responses to the question. In order to determine user privacy needs,
it is critical to talk to SN users directly in order to understand what they want.
Due to a lack of validated measurement instruments to determine SN user
privacy requirements, following the initial assessment by the expert judges, this
research employed focus group and survey research methods to validate user
privacy requirements. Focus groups are a popular method of exploratory, qual-
itative research for understanding consumer impressions, and for structuring
information [19]. Focus groups are generally small population samples, and data
collection is relatively quick and easy. They are used for brainstorming ideas
from (typically) four to ten respondents [24]; they are useful for ongoing discus-
sion, and generate empirically testable hypotheses [8]. Respondents’ interactions
in a group produce the data in this type of research, and the reliance on the
researcher’s focus and the group’s interaction increase the reliability of the col-
lected information [24].
The survey method is a research method for gathering information from a
sample of individuals [31], and is a form of quantitative research. The numbers
of respondents in surveys are generally larger, and these larger numbers help
to validate findings. The survey method is considered to be an efficient way to
collect information about a larger group of people, and can easily be tailored
exactly to the phenomena under study [10].
Both focus group and survey research methods are useful; however, the survey
method is unmatched in reliability85. It is easier to analyse the collected data,
and respondents tend to be more honest in responding to surveys. Furthermore,
focus groups can be driven by the researcher’s interests, and their influence on
the data is prominent; thus, there is always some residual uncertainty about
the accuracy of respondents’ comments [24]. Having considered the pros and
cons of focus group and survey research methods, this study chose the latter for
validating user privacy requirements. Therefore, a survey was designed to verify
SN user privacy requirements.
4.1 Pre-pilot assessment of user privacy requirements
A workshop with a panel of 7 expert judges was organized for 9 October 2012,
to initially assess user privacy requirements. The judges were engaged to assess
the reviewed and synthesized SN user privacy requirements, and to group these
into themes. They were researchers in various areas and themes such as Social
Media, Information Grounds, Business Process Innovation, Enterprise Web 2.0,
Information Disclosure, and Tacit Knowledge Sharing. Each of the expert judges
was a member of at least one SN.
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The judges were randomly divided into three groups. At the outset, the goal
of the workshop was explained, including the meaning of the concept of ‘primary
privacy requirements’. The judges’ generated themes assisted the further analysis
of SN user privacy requirements.
The themes (Refer Table 2) were modified into five primary requirements,
based on the expert judges’ classification and comments from privacy advocates
(Refer Table 3) for example: privacy advocates were inclined to concede ‘reduced
judgement’ as a privacy requirement, and the ‘combining data’ requirement can
be included in the ‘collection or unauthorised secondary use’ requirement [32];
‘Improper or unauthorized access’ and ‘Unwanted execution or inflow of data’ are
merged into the ‘Information Access’ requirement; ‘Accountability and Trans-
parency’, ‘Error’ and ‘Deletion’ requirement are parts of ‘Information Control’
requirement; and the ‘Undesirable or over exposure’ requirement is renamed
under ‘Undesirable or over activities’.
Additionally, in the initial assessment, ‘Group 1’ divided the privacy require-
ments under three themes which include: ‘Worry that information may be dis-
closed to others and misused’, which is part of ‘Collection and storage’; ‘Users
desire for the ability to control their information’, which is part of ‘Information
Control’; and ‘Worry about how the platform will use their information’, which
is part of ‘Information access’ (in Table 3).
‘Group 2’ divided privacy requirements under 5 themes, and were not able
to group some requirements under any of these themes. The theme ‘Third Party
Applications – SN Interaction’ is covered by ‘Information Control’ and ‘Infor-
mation access’ themes; and ‘Data Control by User’, ‘SN Policy’ and ‘Data Secu-
rity’ themes are covered by ‘Information Control’. The ‘Public Visibility’ theme
merges into the ‘Undesirable or over activities’ theme.
‘Group 3’ divided privacy requirements under 5 themes. ‘System require-
ment’, ‘Other privacy or security threat’, and ‘Information control requirement’
are merged under ‘Information Control’ theme. ‘Data storage requirement’ are
merged under ‘Collection and storage’, and ‘Information Leakage concerns’ are
merged under ‘Information access’. After the initial assessment, primary privacy
requirements were validated through the conduct of a survey.
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Table 3: Primary privacy requirements after initial assessments
No.Primary
privacy
require-
ment
DescriptionSub privacy require-
ments
Major
literature
references
1 Information
Control
Privacy
issues
avoided
due to
proper user
control
SN users should be able
to control how their in-
formation is added, col-
lected, deleted, used, and
shared.
[23, 32, 34]
SN users should be able
to delete their informa-
tion permanently on a
per item basis.
([33, 39])
SN users expect simple
and user-friendly data
deletion processes.
[20]
SN users expect simple
and user-friendly privacy
policies.
[36]
SN user privacy should
not be controlled or min-
imized by others for any
reason.
[37]
Service providers should
offer a verification func-
tion when SN users add
a new application devel-
oped by a third party.
[36]
SN users should be able
to control the use of their
information by advertis-
ers.
[12]
Continued on next page
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No.Primary
privacy
require-
ment
DescriptionSub privacy require-
ments
Major
literature
references
2 Collection
and storage
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due to
unlimited,
inappro-
priate and
extensive
amounts of
personal in-
formation
collection
and storage
in SN
[6, 23, 32]
Privacy and data use
policies should clearly
explain how SN user in-
formation will be used.
[36, 29]
SN user information can-
not be collected and
stored without users’ au-
thorisation.
[2, 32]
Service providers should
not able to analyse or
delete any SN user infor-
mation without their au-
thorisation.
[33, 36, 39]
SN users should know
the retention policies for
deleted information.
[29]
Service providers should
not keep SN users’
deleted information.
[29]
3 Information
access
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to infor-
mation
leakage [23,
32, 33].
SN user information
should be well protected
so it cannot be leaked
through direct attacking
techniques.
[15]
Continued on next page
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No.Primary
privacy
require-
ment
DescriptionSub privacy require-
ments
Major
literature
references
SN users should be able
to determine whether
their information is ac-
cessible by others, and
whether it can be copied
and reposted when pri-
vacy settings are by-
passed.
[29, 15]
SN users should be well
protected so that they
do not receive unwanted
communication.
[37, 15, 4]
SN user location infor-
mation should not be dis-
closed or used for track-
ing.
[38, 7]
Third parties should not
have unauthorized access
to SN user information.
[37]
Third party application
providers should specify
the extent of information
collection through their
application.
[37, 7, 30]
SN users should not face
identity issues such as
false names, imperson-
ation or identity theft.
[7]
SN users’ trusted con-
tacts should not be in-
volved in unsolicited pri-
vacy issues.
[1, 37]
Information leakage
should not occur with
mobile or hand-held
devices.
[1]
Continued on next page
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No.Primary
privacy
require-
ment
DescriptionSub privacy require-
ments
Major
literature
references
4 Unauthorized
secondary
use (In-
ternal &
External)
Privacy
issues cre-
ated due
to unau-
thorized
and inap-
propriate
secondary
use of the
SN data by
the service
provider,
third par-
ties or
other ex-
ternal
parties.
[32, 6, 23,
33]
Service providers should
not use SN user informa-
tion for any purpose un-
less it has been autho-
rised by the user.
[1]
SN users’ publicly avail-
able information should
not be collected or mis-
used by others without
their authorisation.
[29, 27]
When SN users provide
information for one rea-
son, it should not be used
for other reasons.
[7, 30]
Users should not be
tracked to identify their
exact location (such as
their home or workplace)
using SN information.
([32])
Pop-up applications
should not use SN user
location information
without users’ authori-
sation.
[38]
Continued on next page
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No.Primary
privacy
require-
ment
DescriptionSub privacy require-
ments
Major
literature
references
SN users must not be
forced to participate in
dynamic interactions
with third parties for
any reason.
[20]
5 Undesirable
activities
Privacy
issues cre-
ated by
undesirable
activity or
overactiv-
ity of other
SN users
([33])
SN user information
should not be over-
exposed to known or
unknown users [29].
[4, 1]
SN user information
should not be publicly
disclosed without their
authorisation.
[14]
Others should not tag SN
users in offensive and un-
flattering photos, posts,
and real life activities
without their authorisa-
tion.
[1]
SN user location infor-
mation should not be dis-
closed through real time
uploaded photos.
[1]
4.2 Pilot Survey
This research included a ‘pilot survey’ to validate SN user privacy requirements
after the initial assessments by the expert judges, and to validate the survey
instruments. The pilot survey recruited respondents from various privacy fo-
rums, such as the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP)10
in LinkedIn. The researchers also recruited experts in the Privacy and SNs field,
and adapted the final survey to reflect their feedback.
10 InternationalAssociationofPrivacyProfessionals(IAPP )( http :
//www.linkedin.com/groups?home = &gid = 1243587&trk = anet ug hm)
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Objectives
The pilot survey aimed to:
1. Validate survey instruments
2. Identify new survey instruments
Method
The pilot survey was conducted online between 7 and 14 December, 2012,
with privacy expert respondents. This survey was anonymous, and both closed
and open-ended questions were used. It mainly focused on validating the sur-
vey questions and approach, included a comment section for each question to
facilitate the experts’ feedback.
The pilot survey was also used to capture the diversity of the user privacy
requirements through an open-ended question: ‘What is the issue that concerns
you most about your privacy when you use SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or
LinkedIn?’. The responses and comments from the question assisted to under-
stand general user privacy requirements. Some of the instruments were designed
as ‘Reverse’ items to avoid inconsistent and invalid responses (for example, a
respondent may choose ‘7 = strongly agree’ for all questions without reading
the survey instruments). For analytical purposes, standard demographics for
cross-tabulations were collected for age, occupation and main social network.
The question ‘Do you have any other comments/concerns/requirements for SN
privacy?’ was included to encourage further comments from the respondents.
A final set of cross-tabulations was created based on respondents’ responses
to thirty-one Likert Scale questions. Closed questions were planned on a 7-point
Likert Scale: 1 = strongly disagree (if you don’t support the statement at all); 2
= disagree; 3= tend to disagree (if you seem to disagree with the statement, but
not strongly); 4= neutral or unsure (if you are unsure, don’t know, or haven’t
thought about it); 5 = tend to agree (if you seem to agree with the statement,
but not strongly); 6= agree; and 7 = strongly agree (if you fully support the
statement).
Instruments
The pilot survey was developed from the primary and secondary privacy
requirements (See Table 3 The Question Analysis Code was used for each of the
pilot survey question. Table 4 shows the privacy requirements and pilot survey
instruments.
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Table 4: Privacy requirements and pilot survey instruments
No. Question
Anal-
ysis
Code
Privacy requirements Pilot survey questions
Information Control
1. ICP1 SN users should be able to
control how their information
is added, collected, deleted,
used and shared.
I should be able to control
how my information is added,
collected, deleted, used and
shared.
2. ICP2 SN users should be able to
delete their information per-
manently on a per item basis.
I should be able to delete my
information permanently on a
per item basis.
3. ICP3 SN users expect simple and
user-friendly data deletion
processes.
I expect simple and user-
friendly data deletion pro-
cesses.
4. ICP4 SN users expect simple and
user-friendly privacy policies.
I expect simple and user-
friendly privacy policies.
5. ICP5 SN user privacy should not
be controlled or minimised by
others for any reason.
My privacy should not be con-
trolled or minimised by others
for any reason.
6. ICP6 Service providers should offer
a verification function when
SN users add a new appli-
cation developed by a third
party.
Service providers should offer
a verification function when I
add a new application devel-
oped by a third party.
7. ICP7 SN users should be able to
control advertisers’ use of
their information.
I should be able to control ad-
vertisers’ use of my informa-
tion.
Information collection and storage
8. CSP1 Privacy and data use policies
should clearly explain how SN
user information will be used.
Privacy and data use policies
should clearly explain how my
information will be used.
9. CSRP2 SN user information cannot
be collected and stored with-
out their authorisation.
My information can be col-
lected and stored without my
authorisation. (Reverse the
privacy requirements in the
pilot survey.)
10. CSP3 Service providers should not
able to analyse or delete any
SN user information without
their authorisation.
Service providers should not
be able to analyse or delete
any of my information with-
out my authorisation.
Continued on next page
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No. Question
Anal-
ysis
Code
Privacy requirements Pilot survey questions
11. CSRP4 SN users should know the re-
tention policies for deleted in-
formation.
It is reasonable if I do not
know the retention policies for
deleted information. (Reverse
the privacy requirements in
the pilot survey.)
12. CSRP5 Service providers should not
keep SN users’ deleted infor-
mation.
It is reasonable for service
providers to keep my deleted
information. (Reverse the pri-
vacy requirements in the pilot
survey.)
Information access
13. IAP1 SN user information should be
well protected so it cannot be
leaked through direct attack-
ing techniques.
My information should be well
protected so it cannot be
leaked through direct attack-
ing techniques.
14. IARP2 SN users should be able to
determine if information is
accessible to others through
copying and reposting when
privacy settings are bypassed.
It is reasonable if SN users are
not able to determine if infor-
mation is accessible to others
through copying and repost-
ing when privacy settings are
bypassed. (Reverse the pri-
vacy requirements in the pilot
survey.)
15. IAP3 SN users should be well pro-
tected so that they will not
receive unwanted communica-
tion.
I should be well protected so
that I will not receive un-
wanted communication.
16. IAP4 SN user location information
should not be disclosed or
used for tracking.
My location information
should not be disclosed or
used for tracking.
17. IAP5 Third parties should not have
unauthorized access to SN
user information.
Third parties should not have
unauthorized access to my in-
formation.
18. IAP6 Third party application
providers should specify
the extent of information
collection through their
application.
Third party application
providers should specify
the extent of information
collection through their
application.
Continued on next page
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No. Question
Anal-
ysis
Code
Privacy requirements Pilot survey questions
19. IAP7 SN users should not face
identity issues such as false
names, impersonation or iden-
tity theft.
I should not face identity is-
sues such as false names, im-
personation or identity theft.
20. IAP8 SN user-trusted contacts can-
not be involved in unsolicited
privacy issues.
My trusted contacts cannot
be involved in unsolicited pri-
vacy issues.
21. IAP9 Information leakage should
not occur when using mobile
or hand-held devices.
Information leakage should
not occur when using mobile
or hand-held devices.
Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external)
22. UUP1 SN user information should
not be used by service
providers for any purpose
unless it has been authorised
by users.
My information should not be
used by service providers for
any purpose unless it has been
authorised by me.
23. UUP2 SN user publicly available in-
formation should not be col-
lected or misused by others
without their authorisation.
My publicly available infor-
mation should not be col-
lected or misused by others
without my authorisation.
24. UUP3 When SN users provide in-
formation for one reason it
should not be used for other
purposes.
When I provide information
for one reason, it should not
be used for other purposes.
25. UURP4 Users should not be tracked
to identify their exact location
(such as their home or work-
place) using SN information.
It is reasonable to be tracked
to identify my exact location
(such as my home or work-
place). (Reverse the privacy
requirements in the pilot sur-
vey.)
26. UUP5 Pop-up applications should
not use SN user location infor-
mation without their authori-
sation.
Pop-up applications should
not use my location informa-
tion without my authorisa-
tion.
27. UUP6 SN users must not be forced to
participate in dynamic inter-
actions with third parties for
any reason.
I must not be forced to partic-
ipate in dynamic interactions
with third parties for any rea-
son.
Undesirable activities
Continued on next page
33
No. Question
Anal-
ysis
Code
Privacy requirements Pilot survey questions
28. UAP1 SN user information should
not be overexposed to users
they know or to users they do
not know.
My information should not be
overexposed to users that I
know or do not know.
29. UAP2 SN users’ information should
not be publicly disclosed with-
out their authorisation.
My information should not be
publicly disclosed without my
authorisation.
30. UAP3 SN users should not be tagged
by others in offensive and
unflattering photos, posts, or
real life activities without
their authorisation.
I should not be tagged by oth-
ers in offensive and unflatter-
ing photos, posts or real life
activities without my authori-
sation.
31. UAP4 SN user location informa-
tion should not be disclosed
through real time uploaded
photos.
My location information
should not be disclosed
through real time uploaded
photos.
After generating the survey questions, the pilot survey instruments, the Ques-
tions Analysis Code, and the demographics instruments were included in Table
5
Table 5: Pilot survey instruments
Demographics instruments
UIP1-You are a
UIP2-Age
UIP3-Which is your main Social Network?
UIP4-What is the issue that concern you most about your privacy when you use
SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn
Measuring privacy requirement instruments
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Pilot survey instruments
Information Control
General requirements for Information Control
ICP1-I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted,
used and shared.
ICP2-I should be able to delete my information permanently on a per item basis.
ICP3-I expect simple and user friendly data deletion processes.
ICP4-I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies.
ICP7-I should be able to control my information use by advertisers.
Level of Information Control
ICP5-My privacy should not be controlled or minimised by others for any reason.
ICP6-Service providers should offer a verification function when I add a new appli-
cation developed by a third party.
Information collection and storage
General requirements for collection and storage
CSP1-Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information will
be used.
CSRP2-My information can be collected and stored without my authorisation. (Re-
verse)
Analysis of collected and stored information
CSP3-Service providers should not able to analyse or delete any of my information
without my authorisation.
Disposal policies of deleted information
CSRP4-It is reasonable if I do not know the retention policies of deleted informa-
tion. (Reverse)
CSRP5-It is reasonable if service providers keep my deleted information. (Reverse)
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Pilot survey instruments
Information access
General requirements on information access
IAP1-My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked through direct
attacking techniques.
IARP2-It is reasonable if I cannot determine information accessibility by others
through copying and reposting when privacy settings are bypassed. (Reverse)
Information access by undesirable communication (external and internal)
IAP3-I should be well protected so that I will not receive unwanted communication.
Information access by external parties
IAP4-My location information should not be disclosed or used for tracking.
IAP5-Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.
IAP6-Third party application providers should specify the extent of information
collection through their application.
IAP7-I should not face identity issues such as false names, impersonation, or identity
theft.
IAP8-My trusted contacts cannot be involved in unsolicited privacy issues.
Information access by using mobile or hand-held devices
IAP9-Information leakage should not occur while using mobile or hand-held devices.
Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external)
General requirements for unauthorised secondary information uses
UUP1-My information should not be used by service providers for any purpose un-
less it has been authorised by me.
UUP2-My publicly available information should not be collected or misused by oth-
ers without my authorisation.
UUP3-When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other
purposes.
Location information uses
UURP4-It is reasonable to be tracked to identify my exact location (such as my
home or workplace). (Reverse)
UUP6-I must not be forced to participate in dynamic interactions with third parties
for any reason.
Unauthorised implicit secondary uses
UUP5-Pop-up application should not use my location information without my au-
thorisation.
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Pilot survey instruments
Undesirable activities
General requirements on undesirable activities
UAP1-My information should not be overexposed to users that I know or do not
know.
Publicly undesirable disclosure
UAP2-My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation.
UAP3-I should not be tagged by others in offensive and unflattering photos, posts,
and real life activities without my authorisation.
Location information disclosure
UAP4-My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded
photos.
Analysis
The pilot survey analysis involved a descriptive analysis ([28] [3] [21] where
no formal power calculations were conducted, and results were treated as pre-
liminary results. The descriptive analysis used opinion inputs from 19 privacy
experts (Refer to Appendix A6 for pilot survey detail analysis).
Summary
The pilot survey validated the survey instrument and formed a basis for
the final survey. As well as being amended, the final survey instruments were
grouped in terms of primary privacy requirements. An open question (for each of
the requirements), which asked respondents if they wished to make any further
comment, was added. The comment sections were considered as ‘allowed to skip’
sections as respondents might not have had any further comment on a specific
section or theme.
The following additional questions were used for collecting comments for each
of the primary requirements:
Do you have any other concerns about:
Controlling your information?
Collecting and storing your information?
Accessing your information?
Unauthorized secondary use of your information?
Over-disclosing or undesirable disclosing of your information?
4.3 Survey
This research included a survey, which primarily focused on validating collected
user privacy requirements in the first stage of the research; however, the survey
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also aimed to collect new privacy requirements. The development and validation
process of the survey instruments is mapped in Figure 5 below.
Method
Pilot survey instruments were initially generated from known privacy require-
ments, and then validated before being included as the final survey instruments.
The survey was conducted online. Both closed and open-ended questions were
used. Some of the instruments were designed as ‘Reverse’ items to avoid in-
consistent and invalid responses (for example, a respondent may choose ‘7 =
strongly agree’ for all questions without reading the survey instruments). The
survey primarily focused on validating collected user privacy requirements in
Stage 1 (Refer Figure 5). It also captured the diversity of user privacy require-
ments through an open-ended question (Refer Section 0). The responses enabled
a deep understanding of users’ general privacy requirements.
Standard demographics for cross-tabulations – such as age, occupation and
main social network – were collected for analytical purposes. A final set of cross-
tabulations were established from Likert Scale questions. Closed questions were
designed on a 7-point Likert Scale: 1= strongly disagree; 2= mostly disagree; 3=
somewhat disagree; 4= neutral or unsure; 5= somewhat agree; 6= mostly agree;
7= strongly agree (Refer Appendix 0 for survey details).
4.4 Administration details
The survey was developed in the English language and conducted through Key
Survey which is a free, official resource for all QUT staff and students (http://survey.qut.edu.au).
Each question in the pilot survey was open-ended, with a Likert Scale response.
The survey was modified according to the feedback received from the pilot sur-
vey.
4.5 Respondents’ recruitment and sample
The survey recruited respondents via university mailing lists and the researcher’s
personal contacts, and was advertised on various renowned and popular SN
sites11 such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. These sites have large numbers
of estimated monthly visitors – 750 000 000, 250 000 000, and 110 000 000
respectively – and were appropriate sources for capturing diverse user privacy
requirements. The purpose was to use those SN site features, such as groups or
pages, to advertise the survey and thus attract more general users.
11 http : //www.ebizmba.com/articles/social − networking − websites
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Fig. 5. Survey instrument development and validation process (Adapted from [9, ?])
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4.6 Evaluation
Initial survey evaluation was done through a pilot survey. The pilot survey was
conducted before commencement of the final survey to test the effectiveness of
the research methodology and survey questions. The survey was modified based
on the feedback from the pilot survey.
4.7 Time estimation
The 40 questions were concise and clear. It was estimated that it would not take
more than 15 minutes to answer them.
4.8 Strength and limitation of the survey
One of the strengths of the designed survey was its online delivery, which at-
tracted more respondents. This research focused on online delivery, since 86%
of the 9600 respondents (in 31 countries) spend time on social networking every
day; and, according to a recent survey, more than a quarter of these say that
they dedicate more than 2 hours per day to social networking activities [18].
4.9 Data cleaning and analysis
For cleaning the data, this research considered completed respondents only. Any
incomplete respondents, and respondents with inconsistent responses, were re-
jected. After manually checking the responses, the data was analysed using IBM
SPSS Statistics 21 and IBM SPSS Amos 21.
4.10 Targeted audiences and prospective respondents
The survey aimed to attract general SNs users as targeted audiences and prospec-
tive respondents. The general users did not need to be expert in SN and privacy
fields; they could simply use an SN for various purposes, such as social net-
working or publicizing personal information; they could be frequent SN users or
rarely use them; they could be concerned or unconcerned about their own pri-
vacy. Respondents were selected in a simple random sampling technique, with
no demographic clustering; thus, any SN user could participate in the survey.
4.11 Question types
The survey consisted of open-ended and closed questions. Closed questions were
answered on a 7-point Likert Scale: 1= strongly disagree; 2= mostly disagree; 3=
somewhat disagree; 4= neutral or unsure; 5= somewhat agree; 6= mostly agree;
7= strongly agree. There was one open-ended question for collecting general user
privacy requirements.
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4.12 The survey
The survey was conducted electronically. An electronic survey is simple to ad-
minister and tabulate. The survey was also conducted through Key Survey
(http://survey.qut.edu.au).
4.13 Instruments
There were 42 survey instruments which are included in Table 6.
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Table 6: Privacy requirements and related survey instrument
Collecting users’ new privacy requirements
UI5-What are the issues that concern you most about your privacy when you
use the SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn?
IC9-Do you have any other concerns about controlling your information?
CS7-Do you have any other concerns about collecting and storing your infor-
mation?
IA8-Do you have any other concerns about leaking your information?
UU6-Do you have any other concerns about unauthorized secondary use of
your information?
UA7-Do you have any other concerns about over-disclosing or undesirable dis-
closing of your information?
UI6-Do you have any other comments/concerns about SN privacy?
Information Control
General requirements for Information Control
IC1- I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted,
used, and shared.
IC4-I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies to control my informa-
tion.
Level of information Control
IC2-The level of control I expect is. . . (Rank out of 7; 1= no control and 7 =
full control).
IC5-My level of privacy should not be altered or reduced for any reason.
Control over information deletion
IC3-I should be able to delete my information on a per item basis.
Control over information use by external parties (i.e. third parties, advertisers)
IC6-Service providers should show an authorization dialog box for permission
to access my information when I add a new application developed by a third
party.
IC7-I should be able to control how advertisers use my information.
Control over fixing privacy issues
IC8-I should be able to fix a privacy issue; for example, tagging or posting
of content about me, spreading my information on SNs of which I am not a
member.
OD3-I should be allowed to block offensive and unflattering content about me.
Continued on next page
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Table 6: Privacy requirements and related survey instrument
Information collection and storage
General requirements for collection and storage
CS1-Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information
will be collected and stored.
CSR2-My information can be collected and stored at any time because I
provided my authorisation when I registered. (Reverse)
Analysis of collected and stored information
CS3-Service providers should not be able to analyse any of my information
without my authorisation; for example, the service providers might want to
target advertising based on age, location or other demographic information.
Information collection and storage by external parties
CS4-I should be informed about the information a third party collects about
me.
Disposal policies for deleted information
CSR5-I do not need to know the disposal policies of deleted information.
(Reverse)
CS6-SNs should not keep my deleted information by storing it out of sight in
their system.
Information access
General requirements on information access
IA1-My information should be well protected so it cannot be improperly ac-
cessed.
Information access by copying
IAR2-I am not worried that my copied information can be reposted by others.
(Reverse)
Information access by undesirable communication (external and internal)
IA3-My account should be well protected from receiving undesirable commu-
nication.
Information access by external parties
IA4-Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.
IA5-Verification procedures for genuine names should be in place to avoid iden-
tity
theft.
Information access by using mobile or hand held devices
IA6-Information leakage should not occur when using mobile or hand-held de-
vices.
Information access by tracking
IA7- I should not be tracked even when I am not on the Social Network; for ex-
ample, you would not like to have your web browsing behaviour tracked when
you are not even logged in.
Continued on next page
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Table 6: Privacy requirements and related survey instrument
Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external)
General requirements for unauthorised secondary information uses
UU1-My publicly available information should be used without my authorisa-
tion. (Reverse)
UU2-When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for
other purposes without my authorisation.
Location information uses
UUR3-I am happy to have my exact location (such as my home or workplace)
identified. (Reverse)
UU4-Location-based applications should not use my location information with-
out my authorisation.
Unauthorised implicit secondary uses
UU5-I should not be forced to participate in implicit interactions with third
parties for any reason.
Undesirable activities
General requirements on undesirable or over disclosure
OD1-My information should not be over-disclosed or undesirably disclosed to
users I know and do not know.
Publicly undesirable or over-disclosure
OD2-My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisa-
tion.
OD5-My location information should not be disclosed through real time up-
loaded photos.
Location information disclosure
OD4-My location information should not be disclosed unless I post it myself.
Disclosure and privacy relationship
ODR5-I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNs and, therefore, privacy
cannot be completely guaranteed. (Reverse)
4.14 Analysis
The survey included demographic questions, open and closed questions, and SN
users’ central tendency analysis regarding privacy and disclosure. This research
considered completed respondents only for further analysis. Key survey provides
features for keeping record for the number of completed, in progress, not started,
click-through responses. Any incomplete respondents, and respondents with in-
consistent, in progress, not started and click- through responses, were rejected
and manually deleted to cleanse the data before exporting the responses into
SPSS data format. This research obtained in total of 139 completed responses
and the responses rate was 76.6%.
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Demographic profile
For analytical purposes, standard demographics for cross-tabulations were
collected for gender, age, most-used SN, and SN which caused the most concern.
The survey had 67.93% male and 32.08% female respondents (Refer Figure
6). Most respondents were in the 26-30 (27.86%) and 31-35 (26.43%) age groups,
indicating that these groups are more concerned about SN privacy (Refer Figure
7).
Fig. 6. Participants’ gender
Fig. 7. Participants’ age groupings
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The respondents were asked which Social Network(s) they use the most (Re-
fer Figure 8), and which Social Network(s) concerns them the most (Figure 9)
to determine if there is any relationship between these two factors. Even though
respondents mostly use Facebook (94.29%), they are concerned about their pri-
vacy while doing so (89.29%). While only approximately half of LinkedIn and
Twitter users have concerns about their privacy, almost 100% of respondents
who mostly use Facebook are concerned about theirs.
Fig. 8. The Social Network(s) most respondents use
Fig. 9. Social Networks which concern most respondents in terms of privacy
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Open-ended question analysis
The survey included an open-ended question: ‘What are the issues that con-
cern you most about your privacy when you use the SNs such as Facebook,
Twitter or LinkedIn?’. The responses from the open-ended question and com-
ments provided an in-depth understanding of general user privacy requirements;
this lead to a more detailed exploration of user privacy requirements. More fac-
tors were explored to determine privacy requirements – factors which were not
included in earlier explorations of privacy issues.
The thematic analysis method (Refer 3 for details) was used to further explore
open-ended questions. The responses were grouped into the existing privacy re-
quirements; however, some respondents’ responses did not belong to the themes
described in Table 3 (e.g. Information Control, Information collection and stor-
age, Information access, Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) and
Undesirable activities). These uncategorised responses are now listed in Table 7
(below). They are categorized into privacy requirements under the sub-themes
of ‘Visibility and Transparency’ and ‘Accountability’, and these sub-themes are
listed under a new privacy requirement, ‘SN Practice’. These new theme and
sub-themes are discussed in the results section in Section 5.
Table 7: Open-ended question analysis
Participants’ statements
or criticisms on privacy is-
sues for SN
SN user prac-
tice privacy
requirements
Privacy re-
quirements’
sub-themes
Privacy
require-
ments’
theme
I want to see how other people
(e.g., in my network, in a list)
see particular content.
Users want to
see how other
users in their
network see
particular
content to find
out how much
privacy they
have.
Visibility and
Transparency
SN Practice
When I see my children using
Facebook, I surprisenly find
how few guidelines and how
little understanding they have
for Facebook privacy.
I am unsure how much privacy
I have. I don’t want to go into
Facebook settings all the time
and check for changes.
Whether privacy setting is do-
ing what it is supposed to
do..!!!!
Continued on next page
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Participants’ statements
or criticisms on privacy is-
sues for SN
SN user prac-
tice privacy
requirements
Privacy re-
quirements’
sub-themes
Privacy
require-
ments’
theme
Default options for SNs are
quite open (especially for un-
derage and those not con-
cerned with security).
Lack of awareness about pri-
vacy in social networks
Users should be informed
when any type of linking infor-
mation or content about them
is given or linked by others by
default without prior submis-
sion.
Users should be
informed when
any type of
linking
information or
content about
them is given or
linked by others
by default.
Accountability,
Visibility and
Transparency
You just can never be certain
if there is something out there
about you that should not be
there. How can you ensure it’s
all ok?
Contacts can be viewed by
all; some photos can also be
viewed by my friends’ con-
tacts and, for Skype, random
people ask to be my friend and
I don’t know them!!
Unannounced changes to the
way the site works
Users should be
informed of any
type of changes
in the Social
Network.
Accountability
Changes to security and pri-
vacy rules without notice
(Facebook in particular)
Enforced changes to pri-
vacy settings; complexity of
settings; unintended conse-
quences
I should be asked before any
changes are made.
Closed question analysis
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Thirty-one closed questions were used to verify SN user privacy requirements
and to determine primary and secondary requirements. Several steps were taken
to create and test the primary and secondary requirements. The Exploratory
Factor Analysis (EFA) (Refer to Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)) and Con-
firmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (Refer to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA),
that derive five orthogonal factors underlie SN user privacy requirements on a
number of various issues representing Information Control, Information Access,
Unauthorized Secondary Use, Information Collection, and Undesirable Activi-
ties.
4.15 SN users’ central tendency analysis
The mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) was calculated to understand the SN
user’s central tendency. The question, ‘I believe that some disclosure is necessary
in SNs and therefore privacy cannot be completely guaranteed’, aimed to identify
users’ view of privacy and disclosure. Of the respondents, 55.71% accepted some
disclosure, 29.29% prioritized privacy, and 15.00% were neutral (Refer to Figure
10).
Mostly disagree 12.14%
Somewhat disagree 4.29%
Neutral or unsure 15.00%
Somewhat agree 20.71%
Mostly agree 16.43%
Strongly agree 18.57%
4.16 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
A principal component factor analysis determined which of the 31 items were
most useful in measuring privacy requirements and if those factors correlate with
each other.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations
The Descriptive Statistics (Refer to Table 8) reports the mean, standard
deviation, and number of cases for each variable included in the analysis. For
example, in Table 8, the mean value for IC1 was 6.5612 indicates that most of
the respondents were asking for strong control over their own SN information.
Standard deviation measured the distribution of a data in the data set. Low
standard deviation values in indicate that the data points tend to be very close
to the mean values, while a high standard deviation indicates data is ‘spread
out’ over the data. For example, in Table 8, high Standard deviation (2.01485)
of ODR6 indicates that SN users choice over privacy and discloser vary. Some
users liked to disclose information whether others prefer strict privacy.
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Fig. 10. I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNs and, therefore, privacy
cannot be completely guaranteed
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Items Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N
IC1 6.5612 1.16168 139
IC3 6.4388 1.25753 139
IC4 6.5108 1.22396 139
IC5 6.4173 1.30717 139
IC6 6.5540 1.07793 139
IC7 6.4748 1.11856 139
IC8 6.2518 1.37310 139
OD3 6.2950 1.34839 139
CS1 6.5324 1.11187 139
CSR2 3.7914 2.15176 139
CS3 5.7482 1.73244 139
CS4 6.5755 1.07662 139
CS5 3.1223 2.16514 139
CS6 6.3957 1.40712 139
IA1 6.7770 .89316 139
IAR2 3.3094 2.14965 139
IA3 6.2518 1.16776 139
IA4 6.7194 .80783 139
IA5 5.6835 1.79789 139
IA6 6.5755 .97042 139
IA7 6.4820 1.22387 139
UUR1 3.7266 2.26762 139
UU2 6.3813 1.35879 139
UUR3 2.9712 2.14659 139
UU4 6.2446 1.49803 139
UU5 6.3813 1.28760 139
OD1 6.3597 1.26266 139
OD2 6.6331 1.12381 139
OD4 6.4388 1.24595 139
OD5 5.9281 1.49705 139
ODR6 4.4388 2.01485 139
The table used by Kaiser-Meyer-Olking (KMO) (Refer to Table 9) was to test as-
sumptions indicates that statistic should be greater than 0.600 and the Bartlett’s
test should be significant (for example,p< .05). KMO was used to assess sampling
adequacy and evaluated the correlations and partial correlations to determine if
the data was likely to coalesce on components (i.e. some items highly correlated,
some not). The Bartlett’s test evaluated whether the correlation matrix was an
identity matrix (1 on the diagonal & 0 on the off diagonal). Here, it was indi-
cated that correlation matrix (of items) was not an identity matrix, which can
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be verified by examining the correlation matrix. The off-diagonal values of cor-
relation matrix were not zeros; which indicated the matrix was not an identity
matrix.
Table 9. KMO and Bartlett’s Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .886
Approx. Chi-Square 2224.085
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity df 465
Sig. .000
A communality (h) is the sum of the squared component loadings and represents
the amount of variance in that variable accounted for by all the components. For
example, all five extracted components were accounted for 60.5 % of the variance
in variable IC1 (h = .605) (Refer to Table 10).
The Table 11 was intuitively named and reported the variance explained by each
component as well as the cumulative variance explained by all components. The
variance explained with regard to this table, refers to the amount of variance in
the total collection of variables/items is explained by the component(s). For in-
stance, component 7 explains 3.245% of the variance in the items; specifically, in
the items’ variance-covariance matrix. The statistics also indicated that 64.445%
of the variance was explained by the 7 extracted components.
Table 16: Total Variance Explained
The scree plot (Refer to Figure 11) graphically displayed the components’
eigenvalues from Table 11.
The next table displays each variable’s loading on each component. Few items
(italic font) in Table 12 did not load on the first component (always the strongest
component without rotation) but created their own retained component (also
with eigenvalue greater than 1). A component should have, as a minimum, 3
items/variables; but deletion of items was reserved until further discovery as to
whether or not the components are related.
A simple correlation on the saved component scores was run to determine if
the components are related (Refer to Table 13).
Table 13 identified none of the factor scores were related suggesting that
the factors themselves were not related, which in turn indicated the use of an
‘orthogonal or verimax rotation’ in subsequent factor analysis.
52
Table 10. Communalities using Principal Component Analysis Extraction Method
Initial Extraction
IC1 1.000 .605
IC3 1.000 .692
IC4 1.000 .673
IC5 1.000 .577
IC6 1.000 .706
IC7 1.000 .653
IC8 1.000 .552
OD3 1.000 .680
CS1 1.000 .607
CSR2 1.000 .457
CS3 1.000 .731
CS4 1.000 .775
CS5 1.000 .589
CS6 1.000 .617
IA1 1.000 .790
IAR2 1.000 .619
IA3 1.000 .635
IA4 1.000 .606
IA5 1.000 .618
IA6 1.000 .656
IA7 1.000 .648
UUR1 1.000 .654
UU2 1.000 .509
UUR3 1.000 .626
UU4 1.000 .649
UU5 1.000 .716
OD1 1.000 .753
OD2 1.000 .735
OD4 1.000 .568
OD5 1.000 .709
ODR6 1.000 .575
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Table 11. Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total % of Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
Total % of Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
1 10.790 34.806 34.806 10.790 34.806 34.806
2 2.322 7.491 42.297 2.322 7.491 42.297
3 1.872 6.038 48.335 1.872 6.038 48.335
4 1.513 4.881 53.215 1.513 4.881 53.215
5 1.334 4.303 57.518 1.334 4.303 57.518
6 1.141 3.682 61.200 1.141 3.682 61.200
7 1.006 3.245 64.445 1.006 3.245 64.445
8 .933 3.008 67.453
9 .876 2.827 70.280
10 .810 2.611 72.892
11 .740 2.388 75.280
12 .692 2.233 77.513
13 .664 2.143 79.656
14 .627 2.021 81.677
15 .563 1.817 83.495
16 .524 1.690 85.184
17 .509 1.643 86.828
18 .475 1.533 88.361
19 .433 1.396 89.757
20 .423 1.363 91.120
21 .391 1.262 92.382
22 .360 1.163 93.545
23 .342 1.102 94.647
24 .305 .985 95.632
25 .270 .871 96.503
26 .225 .725 97.228
27 .210 .676 97.905
28 .186 .599 98.504
29 .184 .592 99.096
30 .167 .537 99.633
31 .114 .367 100.000
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Table 12. Component Matrix
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IC1 .666 -.030 .356 -.038 -.080 -.025 -.157
IC3 .654 .102 .296 -.169 -.029 .203 -.309
IC4 .636 .105 .201 -.170 -.363 .222 .088
IC5 .617 .025 .345 -.055 -.081 -.075 -.247
IC6 .764 -.012 .109 .015 -.273 -.116 -.148
IC7 .734 .114 -.135 .138 .005 -.070 .242
IC8 .561 .220 .092 -.106 -.322 .253 .050
OD3 .559 .145 -.386 -.325 -.239 -.173 -.074
CS1 .746 -.046 .147 .061 -.039 -.005 .144
CSR2 -.199 .544 .200 .040 .240 -.053 -.139
CS3 .565 .156 -.277 .151 .393 .353 -.095
CS4 .791 .011 -.117 .132 .079 -.280 .182
CS5 -.271 .561 -.344 -.015 -.055 .208 .188
CS6 .372 .080 -.055 -.119 .529 -.157 -.387
IA1 .841 .064 .032 -.033 -.061 -.205 -.175
IAR2 -.067 .646 .309 -.127 .175 -.147 .184
IA3 .665 .126 -.390 -.022 .107 -.101 -.051
IA4 .624 -.098 -.070 .176 .092 -.364 .174
IA5 .375 .412 -.480 -.039 -.159 -.005 -.226
IA6 .757 .115 -.119 -.013 -.009 -.230 .035
IA7 .629 -.025 .224 -.073 .043 -.230 .376
UUR1 -.182 .553 .493 .130 .210 -.028 .101
UU2 .644 -.039 .049 .298 .008 -.005 .032
UUR3 -.296 .404 -.150 .531 -.048 -.138 -.220
UU4 .605 -.090 .336 -.014 .302 .265 .021
UU5 .551 -.133 -.117 .498 .162 .258 .199
OD1 .732 .027 -.134 .289 -.093 .317 -.075
OD2 .772 -.131 .137 .292 -.076 .092 -.065
OD4 .568 .047 -.158 -.407 .211 .001 .091
OD5 .530 .103 -.163 -.466 .227 .283 .206
ODR6 -.194 .644 .080 .111 -.308 .027 .094
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Table 13. Correlations matrix
REGR
factor
score 1
REGR
factor
score 2
REGR
factor
score 3
REGR
factor
score 4
REGR
factor
score 5
REGR
factor
score 6
REGR
factor
score 7
REGR
factor
score 1
Pearson
Correlation
1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 2
Pearson
Correlation
.000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 3
Pearson
Correlation
.000 .000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 4
Pearson
Correlation
.000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 5
Pearson
Correlation
.000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 6
Pearson
Correlation
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
REGR
factor
score 7
Pearson
Correlation
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1
Sig. (2-
tailed)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
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Fig. 11. Scree plot
Factor Analysis The rotated component matrix in Table 14 showed which
items/variables load on which components after rotation. The rotation cleaned
up the interpretation by eliminating the global first component to provide a clear
depiction of principal components (marked with various color for each group).
Items loaded higher than 0.4 on any factor [35] were considered for further
analysis. Generally, a factor loading was considered acceptable if the primary
factor loading was at least double any secondary factor loadings.
The Component Transformation Matrix (Refer Table 15) displayed the cor-
relations among the components prior and after rotation.
Finally, the few items (italic) were eliminated which (a) by themselves created
a component (components should have more than 2 items or variables) and (b)
did not load on the un-rotated or initial component 1. Component 6 and 7 were
eliminated in this way and the red marked variables were removed. The extrac-
tion proceeded and the numbers of factors were extracted from 7 to 5. Refer to
Table 17 for ‘Total Variance Explained’ after removing two components/factors.
All the communalities indicated 50% or more of the variance in each vari-
able/item was explained by the combined four components; with three exceptions
that were lower (Refer to Table 16).
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Table 14. Rotated Component Matrix
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IC1 .695 .295 .089 -.020 -.012 .112 .113
IC3 .744 .048 .178 .129 .056 .224 .184
IC4 .641 .189 .126 .185 -.005 .294 -.300
IC5 .692 .252 .026 .032 .026 .055 .172
IC6 .666 .424 .080 .235 -.146 .019 .008
IC7 .253 .615 .342 .251 -.002 .168 -.050
IC8 .535 .129 .191 .283 .067 .227 -.276
CS1 .484 .506 .262 .029 -.062 .204 -.031
CSR2 -.041 -.149 -.028 .033 .617 -.123 .188
CS3 .127 .134 .689 .289 .028 .219 .301
CS4 .265 .758 .235 .204 -.071 .124 .113
CS5 -.373 -.208 .119 .409 .386 .037 -.271
CS6 .155 .146 .117 .151 .082 .129 .715
IA1 .599 .517 .108 .304 -.067 .094 .215
IAR2 -.005 .083 -.146 .010 .760 .116 -.005
IA3 .162 .443 .266 .500 -.102 .171 .229
IA4 .169 .723 .138 .066 -.119 .025 .132
IA5 .120 .106 .147 .751 .050 -.028 .059
IA6 .356 .596 .139 .340 -.028 .148 .125
IA7 .314 .657 .033 -.097 .060 .318 -.053
UUR1 .041 -.041 .000 -.239 .765 -.093 -.007
UU2 .376 .458 .385 .043 -.078 -.035 .035
UUR3 -.217 -.075 .121 .195 .309 -.651 .012
UU4 .476 .198 .405 -.222 .041 .356 .203
UU5 .122 .385 .723 -.047 -.158 -.007 -.042
OD1 .454 .255 .613 .278 -.160 .023 -.047
OD2 .584 .417 .432 .018 -.179 -.025 .024
OD3 .249 .321 -.101 .648 -.166 .238 .028
OD4 .183 .299 .079 .279 -.040 .558 .218
OD5 .151 .140 .231 .268 .015 .731 .081
ODR6 .003 -.109 -.066 .249 .552 -.216 -.382
Table 15. Component Transformation Matrix
Component1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 .610 .578 .351 .260 -.125 .271 .123
2 .017 -.035 .047 .488 .865 -.059 -.084
3 .555 -.053 -.190 -.706 .390 -.011 -.048
4 -.089 .228 .563 -.202 .033 -.755 -.111
5 -.356 .074 .324 -.291 .248 .288 .731
6 .140 -.625 .641 -.029 -.051 .318 -.273
7 -.407 .462 .081 -.264 .141 .412 -.596
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Table 16. Communalities after removing two components
Components Initial Extraction
IC1 1.000 .596
IC3 1.000 .617
IC4 1.000 .629
IC5 1.000 .526
IC6 1.000 .658
IC7 1.000 .623
IC8 1.000 .552
CS1 1.000 .591
CSR2 1.000 .428
CS3 1.000 .617
CS4 1.000 .763
CS5 1.000 .546
IL1 1.000 .758
ILR2 1.000 .598
IL3 1.000 .635
IL4 1.000 .552
IL5 1.000 .606
IL6 1.000 .658
IL7 1.000 .551
UUR1 1.000 .655
UU2 1.000 .489
UU4 1.000 .557
UU5 1.000 .693
OD1 1.000 .754
OD2 1.000 .710
OD3 1.000 .660
ODR6 1.000 .491
Table 17: Total Variance Explained after removing two compo-
nents/factors
ComponentInitial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of
Squared Loadings
Rotation Sums of
Squared Loadings
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
1 10.05 37.223 37.223 10.05037.223 37.223 4.868 18.029 18.029
2 2.210 8.185 45.408 2.210 8.185 45.408 4.504 16.681 34.710
3 1.817 6.731 52.139 1.817 6.731 52.139 2.960 10.963 45.673
4 1.316 4.873 57.011 1.316 4.873 57.011 2.208 8.176 53.849
5 1.121 4.152 61.163 1.121 4.152 61.163 1.975 7.314 61.163
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ComponentInitial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of
Squared Loadings
Rotation Sums of
Squared Loadings
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
Total % of
Vari-
ance
Cumulative
%
6 .978 3.624 64.787
7 .872 3.228 68.015
8 .801 2.968 70.982
9 .757 2.805 73.788
10 .697 2.583 76.371
11 .652 2.414 78.784
12 .588 2.178 80.963
13 .574 2.127 83.090
14 .527 1.953 85.043
15 .486 1.801 86.843
16 .470 1.742 88.585
17 .424 1.569 90.154
18 .402 1.491 91.645
19 .383 1.417 93.062
20 .348 1.289 94.351
21 .323 1.195 95.545
22 .286 1.059 96.604
23 .218 .808 97.412
24 .205 .761 98.173
25 .195 .723 98.896
26 .173 .639 99.535
27 .125 .465 100.000
Table 18: Grouped users privacy requirements
Component
1 2 3 4 5
Information control
IC1 .652 .362 .137 -.008 -.146
IC3 .744 .164 .190 .030 .006
IC4 .750 .140 .120 -.038 .179
IC5 .625 .348 .077 .035 -.087
IC6 .637 .437 .161 -.145 .121
IC8 .670 .059 .157 .005 .274
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Table 18: Grouped users privacy requirements
Component
1 2 3 4 5
CS1 .533 .458 .293 -.092 -.057
OD2 .552 .337 .503 -.180 -.085
Information Access
IC7 .290 .581 .397 -.012 .210
CS4 .263 .763 .313 -.081 .089
IA1 .571 .605 .185 -.084 .156
IA3 .151 .587 .303 -.119 .402
IA4 .150 .679 .234 -.118 -.019
IA7 .353 .628 .110 .070 -.123
IA6 .374 .654 .191 -.056 .226
Unauthorized Secondary Use
CS3 .127 .228 .694 .007 .258
UU2 .319 .404 .470 -.053 -.016
UU4 .438 .274 .457 .070 -.275
UU5 .117 .223 .778 -.149 -.041
OD1 .443 .202 .661 -.158 .237
Collection and storage
CSR2 -.125 -.013 -.056 .639 .017
IAR2 .038 .087 -.126 .755 .060
UUR1 .032 -.123 .024 .780 -.174
ODR6 .051 -.234 -.088 .547 .357
Undesirable or over activites
OD3 .308 .439 -.049 -.196 .576
IA5 .118 .227 .162 .031 .716
CSR5 -.240 -.268 .035 .336 .549
Items were grouped according to each the component score and each the
groups were named as primary user privacy requirements based on how the sub-
factors were loaded. Primary user privacy requirements were Information control,
Information Access, Unauthorized Secondary Use, Collection and storage and
Undesirable or over activites (Refer to Table 18). These primary user privacy
requirements were used in the next step to confirm the factors for user privacy
requirements.
61
4.17 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm the primary
SN user privacy requirements. IBM Amos 2112 Structural Equation Modelling
(SEM) program was used to examine how well structural coefficients conform
to user primary user privacy requirements. A Principal Component Analysis
method was considered for the analysis. Alternative models of SN user privacy
requirements described in 4.2 were used for furher analysis. The CFA techniques
test four potential models for comparison to confirm the primary user privacy
requirements. The best fit model was considered to represent primary user pri-
vacy requirements. Each model was drawn to underlie the 27 observed variables
were extracted.
‘Model 1’, (Refer to Figure 12), all observed variables pointing from the
latent variable ‘Privacy Requirement’. In ‘Model 2’ (Refer to Figure 13); all
observed variables were pointing from two latent variables ‘maintenance’ and
‘collection’. ‘Model 3’ shows (Refer to Figure 14) that all observed variables
were pointing from three latent variables ‘control’, ‘collection’ and ‘management’.
The ‘Model 4’ shows (Refer to Figure 15) all observed variables pointing from
the five latent variables ‘Control’, ‘Access’, ‘Secondary Use’, ‘Collection’ and
‘Undesirable Activities’. The estimation of the overall model fit for observed
variables (Refer to Table 19).
Table 19. The overall model fit for observed variables
Model 1:One
Factor
Model
2:Two Fac-
tors
Model
3:Three
Factors
Model
4:Five Fac-
tors
χ2(CMIN) 623.16 522.56 553.88 476.64
DF 299 296 298 289
χ2/DF 2.084 1.766 1.859 1.649
p-value 0 0 0 0
RMSEA 0.083 0.07 0.074 0.064
The overall fit for ‘Model 4’ exhibited much stronger measures of fit than any
of the hypothesied models substantially better than the single, two or three
factor models. The Chi-squared, χ2 test yields a value of 476.64 which, had a
corresponding lowest value of χ2/DF (Chi-squared/Degrees of freedom, DF) at
1.649. Prediction (p-value) of 0 was good since too high a p-value rejects the
null of a good fit. Additionally, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) was 0.064, well close to the .05 cut-off. Both tests suggest that the
model was a good fit to the data. Therefore, properties of the ‘Model 4’ were
considered further.
12 http : //www − 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en/spss− amos
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Fig. 12. Model 1
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Fig. 13. Model 2
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Fig. 14. Model 3
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Fig. 15. Model 4
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The factor Control in ‘Model 4’ (Refer to Figure 15), had strong standardized
loadings for some factors ( .79 for IC6, .76 for CS1 and .8 for OD2) and moderate
standardized loadings on other factors (.69 for IC1, .67 for IC3, .66 for IC4, .65 for
IC5 and .56 for IC8), suggesting that Information Control was a reliable indicator
for those sub-factors. The squared multiple correlations provided information on
how much variance the common factors account for in the observed variables.
Control had a strong coefficient of determination, R2 of .618 with IC6, .576 with
CS1, and .638 with OD2. The remaining moderate R2 statistics were IC1 (.476),
IC3 (.449), IC4 (.434), IC5 (.419), IC8 (.316).
The factor Access had strong standardized loadings on all factors (.74 for IC7,
.84 for CS4, .85 for IA1, .65 for IA4, .78 for IA6 and .63 for IA7), suggesting that
Information Access was a reliable indicator for those sub-factors. Access had a
strong R2 of .611 with IA6, .719 with IA1, .702 with CS4 and .552 with IC7.
The remaining moderate R2 statistics were IA7 (.393) and IA4 (.422).
The factor Secondary Use had strong standardized loadings on all factors
( .620 for CS3, .689 for UU2, .583 for UU4, .626 for UU5 and .838 for OD1),
suggesting that Secondary Use was a reliable indicator for those sub-factors.
Secondary Use had a strong R2 of .703 with OD1. The remaining moderate R2
statistics were UU5(.392), UU4 (.340), UU2 (.475) and CS3 (.384).
The factor Collection had strong standardized loadings on some factors (.66
for IAR2 and .70 for UUR1) and moderate standardized loadings on some factors
(.46 for CSR2 and .49 for ODR6), suggesting that Collection was a reliable
indicator for those sub-factors. Collection had a moderate R2 of .21 with CSR2,
.43 with IAR2, .48 with UUR1 and .24 with ODR6.
The factor Undesirable Activites had moderate standardized loadings on
some factors (.34 for OD3 and .24 for IA5) and low standardized loadings on -.23
for CS5, suggesting that Undesirable Activites may be a reliable indicator for
those sub-factors since two factors moderately loaded this factor. Undesirable
Activites had a moderate R2 of .12 with OD3 and low R2 of .06 with IA5, .06
with CS5.
The final correlation between factors Control and Access was very strong
at 0.878 and the covariance between Control and Access was significantly var-
ious from zero (p<0.001). The correlation between Control and Unauthorized
Secondary Use and between Control and Undesirable Activities were also very
strong which were .830 and 1.303 accordingly. The correlation between Unde-
sirable Activities and Secondary Use was very strong which was 1.206 and the
covariance between those factors was significantly various from zero (p<0.001).
The correlation between Access and Secondary Use were also very strong which
was .799 and the covariance between them was significantly various from zero
(p<.0.001). However, the correlation between Collection with the other factors
Control, Secondary Use, Undesirable Activites and Access were very small which
were -.164, -.226, -.490 and -.193 accordingly. The covariance between them were
.152, .068, .057, .152 and are significantly various from zero (p>.0.001).
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5 Results
The analysis of the closed questions provided the five orthogonal privacy require-
ments of: Information Control, Information Access, Unauthorized Secondary
Use, Information Collection, and Undesirable Activities. irement provided a
deeper understanding of general user privacy requirements. A new requirement
– ‘SN Practice’ – was synthesized as a primary privacy requirement. Addition-
ally, the factor ‘Undesirable Activities’ moderated standardized loadings on some
sub-factors, thus suggesting that ‘Undesirable Activities’ could belong to another
factor. Moreover, the ‘SN Practice’ requirement covered factors categorized in
‘Undesirable Activities’, as these can limit the accountability and transparency
of SN practices.
Taking these modifications into account, SN users have five primary user
privacy requirements: Information Control, Information Access, Unauthorized
Secondary Use, Information Collection and SN practice (Refer Table 20; section
5.1; section 5.3; section 5.2; section 5.4 and section 5.5).
5.1 Information control
SNs have become virtual public spaces for the private information of users.
That is, users use the public space, the SN, to deposit and share their personal
information; however, they may lose their privacy as soon as the information is
published in these virtual public places.
Privacy issues can be created without proper user control. Users may want to
control their own information; for example, they may wish to delete or post data
on a per item basis for a friend, or even to permanently delete their own account
[39]; [33]. Privacy issues can also be created due to inappropriate data deletion in
SNs [39]. By controlling the deletion process, users may be able to control their
information and thus limit the unwanted consequences of poor judgements they
may have made when posting information. Users may not want other users to
be influenced by their incorrect or partial information on their profile [37] ; thus,
they may want to control their information by deleting, editing, or updating it.
Privacy issues can also be created by a lack of SN accountability for the way
they handle their users’ information [39]. For example, users might want to exer-
cise more control over their addition to various groups or networks [29], and may
want to control their visibility and the transparency of their information [39].
Users may also want simplified, transparent and user friendly privacy policies
[36], which indicate how they can control their own information.
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Informa-
tion Control requirement. It defines this requirement as ‘the degree to which SN
users are concerned about the amount of control SNs have over user information’.
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Table 20. Primary and secondary privacy requirements
Primary privacy
requirements
Secondary privacy requirements Analysis code
Information
Control
Information addition IC1
Information deletion IC2
Information sharing IC3
Information altering IC4
Information re-use IC5
Information export IC6
Control over fixing privacy issues,
even if not the SN member
IC7
Information
collection and
storage
Information collection and storage CS1
Analysis of collected and stored infor-
mation
CS2
Notification of information collection
and storage
CS3
Disposal of collected and stored infor-
mation
CS4
Information
access
Information access IA1
Communication IA2
Information access by copying IA3
Information access by using mobile or
hand-held devices
IA4
Information access by tracking IA5
Behavioral information access IA6
Unauthorized
secondary use
(Internal &
External)
Secondary information uses UU1
Location information uses UU2
Implicit secondary information uses UU3
SN Practice
Information disclosure SP1
Notification of linking information; for
example, location information, behav-
ioral information with content
SP2
Practice accountability SP3
Practice visibility and transparency SP4
Notification of any type of informa-
tion changes
SP5
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5.2 Information access
Information access – internally to third parties, or externally to other parties
– can create privacy issues. Information access through improper or unautho-
rized access, or unwanted execution or inflow of data to various SN stakeholders
can initiate user privacy issues. Improper or unauthorized access to view or work
with data may also create privacy issues ([23]; [32]). For example, unwanted com-
munication from restricted or unwanted contacts inside or outside the networks
can trigger information access ([4]; [15]; [37]). Additionally, privacy issues may
be created by unauthorized execution in personal devices, or by the operation of
spyware which triggers unauthorized collection of personal data [33]. Eventually,
user information can be leaked through direct attacking techniques [15].
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Informa-
tion Access requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which SN
users are concerned about the amount of SN access to user information’.
5.3 Collection and storage
Privacy issues can be created due to the unlimited, inappropriate and extensive
amounts of personal information collection and storage in SNs [32]; ([6]); [23].
User information and activities in SN can be collected and stored indefinitely
by service/platform providers [29]; [32], and can be accessed by other interested
parties. Users cannot be sure how this collected information will be used against
them in the future. They might need to consider the privacy risk/benefits trade-
off of their information usage, and limit their personal information collection
and storage accordingly.
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Collection
and Storage requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which an
SN user is concerned about the amount of SN user information collection and
storage’.
5.4 Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external)
Privacy issues are also created by the unauthorized and inappropriate secondary
use of SN data by the Service Provider, third parties, or other external parties
[32, ?,23, 33]. These types of issues can be created when a SN does not follow
the code of fair information practice. User information can be collected for one
purpose, but used for another internal or external purpose [32], and thus privacy
issues can be triggered. Users might be worried about how the service/platform
provider will use user uploads [1] or other information. User might want to limit
their information uses and may not grant license for further use [7, ?].
Privacy issues might also be created as a result of the combination of per-
sonal data with other information, such as location information; this combi-
nation then provides more comprehensive user profile information ([32]; [33]).
Combining data is an unauthorized secondary use of information [32], since user
information meshes with other external information to create privacy breaches
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and user concerns [38]. Users might be worried how a service platform or other
external parties will eventually use their information.
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Unautho-
rized Secondary Uses requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to
which a SN user is concerned about the amount of unauthorized secondary use
of SN user information”.
5.5 SN practice
The practice requirement describes the cognitive understanding or perception
[34] of SN practices. This requirement concerns privacy issues arising from vari-
ous stakeholder practices in SN services. SN service practices are not limited to,
but can include visibility, transparency and accountability.
Users might expect transparent views [14] of how information is used, shared,
collected, accessed, or aggregated with other information and information flows.
This transparency would assist them to understand the SN services that are
available to protect their privacy; for example, SN service providers can employ
a privacy monitoring system such as ‘Privacy Mirror’ [25] – an example of this
is ‘View as’ feature in Facebook – or Identity Mirror[22] to view data in a trans-
parent and understandable way. Such a system can assist users to understand
how their profile is seen by others.
There are three issues with ensuring transparency [14] in SN services, how-
ever. Firstly, data protection authority to ensure transparency is not enforced.
The second issue is related to aggregated services, where the need for all parties
to agree with the transparency might make the services complicated. The final
issue is that SN service providers or data mining parties may not wish to disclose
their algorithms.
Users might be interested in accountability for service providers. While it is
unlikely, SN services could readily change their privacy rules and users would
then be unaware of the current and valid privacy settings. Furthermore, SN users
might not be aware of the unintended consequences of the enforced changes, and
this could initiate major privacy issues; for example, personal information could
suddenly become publicly visible.
The trustworthiness of SN services can be highly doubtful, and users should
be made aware of changes to privacy settings. Continuous changes in settings
(always to the detriment of user privacy) are something the users could abhor;
they should be aware and take measures to limit the possible disclosure of private
information as a result of these changes. Other stakeholders, as well as service
providers, should be accountable for their activities in SN services.
Privacy issues can also be created due to undesirable or over-exposure by
other SN users [33], service/platform providers, or other stakeholders. By defi-
nition, SNs promote sharing and exposure through SN functionalities; however,
in some circumstances, undesirable or over-exposure of user information (for
example, by other users or stakeholders who want to control others’ informa-
tion) might be considered inappropriate. In other words, private information
can become publicly available; information can be displayed unexpectedly [1];
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information might be misused by interested parties; and users might be tagged
by undesirable offensive photos or activities, or overexposed through real life
activities.
This research measures SN user privacy requirements with respect to this
SN Practice requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which a
SN user is concerned about SNs’ practices in dealing with SN user information’.
This requirement will assist in identifying how user information is intervened in
practice, and the pre-emptive action users can take to protect their privacy. This
requirement also deals with the sub-requirements of transparency and account-
ability.
6 Summary and conclusion
SN users each have various privacy requirements to protect their information; to
address this issue, a six-stage thematic analysis of scholarly articles related to
SN user privacy concerns were synthesized, and then grouped into primary and
secondary user privacy requirements (Section 3). These SN user privacy require-
ments were then validated through the three steps of a pre-pilot assessment , a
pilot survey and final survey (Section 4. The pre-pilot assessment engaged expert
judges for the initial assessment of SN user privacy requirements. Assessment
results were integrated into the pilot survey. Experts in the privacy in social
networks field then assessed the pilot survey, and feedback was integrated into
the final survey.
This mixed methods research combines the strengths of quantitative and
qualitative research to survey general SN users, and thus construct SN user pri-
vacy requirements. Twenty-five secondary user privacy requirements and five
primary user privacy requirements were generated into Information control, In-
formation collection, Unauthorized information access, Secondary information
use, and SN practices (Section 5).
This paper proposes a new set of SN user privacy requirements and con-
structed 5 primary user requirements and 25 secondary user privacy require-
ments which are essential in specifying user rights in SNs.
This research has the potential to provide for the development of more sophis-
ticated privacy controls which will increase the ability of SN users to: specify
their rights in SNs; to determine the protection of their own SN data, using
primary user privacy requirements and secondary user privacy requirements;
to specify how they will control their information for collection, unauthorized
access, and secondary use; and to specify how others will practise that control.
This research captured the SN user privacy requirements through a mixed
methods approach; such an approach has been rarely used to examine the privacy
issue. To date, many privacy requirements had not been addressed by typical
SN services; furthermore, these requirements could not be uncovered through a
study of existing systems. This research, however, established this new knowledge
of SN user privacy requirements via the qualitative survey research method.
The practical application of this new knowledge is that SN service providers
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can better design, improve the old, or implements new SN services, using this
enhanced understanding of essential SN user rights and privacy requirements.
This research has the potential for SN stakeholders to attain a greater un-
derstanding of Privacy in the SN context through the new concept of privacy
based on SN user privacy requirements. Privacy is classified and represented as
‘SN practices’, and ‘Control of these practices’, in SNs.
This paper investigated SN user privacy requirements which were grouped
into “information collection”, “unauthorised information access” and “secondary
use of information” to form the superset of “concerns about information control”.
Therefore, SN user privacy requirements are classified and represented as “SN
practices” and “control of practices”. The findings align with those of Stewart
and Segars [34].
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